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In Hill, "On Trustees," Bispham's Edition, page 222,
it is said that a court of equity will interfere in cases of
fraud, to administer justice in favor of innocent persons
who have suffered by it without any fault on their side,
and further, that the court has never ventured to lay
down any rule as to what shall constitute fraud, for if
it were to do so, the jurisdiction would be cramped by
new schemes which the fertility of man's invention would
contrive.
There are, however, a number of different classes of
cases which have arisen frequently enough in practice
to furnish material for a more careful analysis of the
exact nature and extent of the jurisdiction exercised.
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the principles
involved in the class of cases outlined in the title, and to
ascertain how far the statute of frauds is available as a
defence to a purchaser who declines to fulfill the terms
of his promise.
In this discussion, for the sake of brevity, the letter
A will represent the person having an interest as execution
debtor, or otherwise, in the property about to be sold,
and the letter B will indicate the purchaser at the sale.
The facts in the case of Pebbles v. Reading, 8 S. & R.
484 (1822), furnish a convenient text upon which to
hinge the discussion. In that case, the land of A, being
about to be sold, B, a stranger, orally agreed with him
to buy the property at the sale, and reconvey upon payment of the purchase money and interest. At the sale
B bought for $170 land worth $750. Soon after the sale
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A moved out, and B moved in, and then B sold the
property to X, against whom A brought an action of
ejectment. It did not appear in the case whether anyone
was deterred from bidding at the sale because of B's
presence, or what reliance, if any, A placed on B's promise.
The verdict was for A in the court below, and on appeal
it was said that the declaration of B was an oral trust
which A was entitled to prove, and upon which he could*
maintain his action of ejectment. The case went off on
the ground that X was a purchaser for value without
notice, and on the question of the plaintiff's laches. It
is true that the Act of 1856 was not then in force, and that
the Supreme Court had abandoned its former doctrine,that the Act of March 21, 1772, 1 Sm. L. 389, Sec. i,
applied to oral trusts. The case is useful, however, as
illustrating the real relation of the parties, of which the
Supreme Court somewhat lost sight when it came to
consider the effect of the Act of i856. It is believed,
however, that this case represents the law in Pennsylvania to-day, with one qualification hereafter to be noted;
that is, that A must have relied in some way on B's
promise.
A brief analysis of the relation of the parties will not
be out of order. It is to the interest of A that the property
bring its full value, as any overplus, after satisfying all
claims, will belong to him, according to the nature of
his interest, and if no overplus, he will be benefited in so
far as the proceeds are sufficidnt partially to satisfy the
claims.
B promises A that if he should buy the property in he.
will hold it for him, and allow him to redeem upon the
terms stated. It is submitted that this promise is nothing
more or less, although not so recognized in terms by the
Supreme Court, than an imperfect declaration of trust,
a promise to hold property to be acquired in the future
for the benefit of the promisee; such a declaration as
equity, entirely apart from the Statute of Frauds, never
enforces in favor of a volunteer. A, however, is not a
volunteer. He has suffered loss; his property has been
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sold for less than its value, and if he suffered his loss
because of his reliance on B's promise, he is in a position
to ask the chancellor to enforce a trust in his favor. His
remedy at law is inadequate, for he cannot bring an
action of contract, there being no consideration. (Bennett
v.The Bank, 87 Pa. 382, I878.) He cannot bring an action
of deceit because the promise of the defendant is not as
to any existing fact, but is to do something in the future.
The Act of April 22, 1856, Section 2, Pamphlet .Laws
532, in effect provides that all declarations of trust of
lands shall be manifested by writing, except in the case
of trusts arising by implication or construction of law.'
Since the statute requires all trusts to be manifested by
writing, it does not make the trust void, but simply
prescribes the manner of proof, and it can only be set up
by the party to be charged. The only question, therefore,
is how far is the statute available as a defence to B, and
it is inaccurate and misleading to say that the trust is
void because of the statute.
It was laid down by Lord Hardwicke, in the case of
Reach v. Kennegate, i Vesey, 125"that the Statute of Frauds should never be understood to protect
fraud, and therefore wherever a case is infected with fraud, the court

will not suffer the statute to protect it so as that anyone should run
away with a benefit not intended."

In Boynton v. Housler, 73 Pa. 453 (1873), where the
real estate of a decedent being about to be sold in execution, B promised the widow, who resided on the ground,
that he would buy the land and give her the privilege of
taking eighteen acres, if the widow and her friends would
not bid against him. They refrained from bidding in
consequence. The court enforced the agreement in an
action of ejectment by B against the widow.
In the case of Wolford v. Herrington, 86 Pa. 39 (1877),
Mr. Justice Sharswood laid down the law, as follows:
"Where anyone having any interest (except the defendant
in the execution), is induced to confide in the verbal
2 The clause in italics is not the law, as the other cases cited show.
The learned judge cited Boynton v. Hoster, 73 Pa. 453; Beegle v.
Wentz, 55 Pa. 369,-neither in point.
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promise of another that he will purchase for the benefit
of the former at a sheriff's sale, and in pursuance of this
allows him to become the holder of the legal title, a
subsequent denial by the latter of the confidence is such
a fraud as -will convert the purchaser into a trustee
ex-maleficio." In that case, the land of A, the judgment
debtor, on which he resided, was about to be sold at
sheriff's sale, and B agreed with A's wife, who held an
unrecorded deed to the land, that he would buy the
property in at the sheriff's sale and give her two years
in which to redeem, and that he would give a writing
to that effect before the property was struck off. He
bought the property in at less than the market value,
repudiated the agreement, and brought -anejectment on
the sheriff's deed. Held that the agreement was valid,
and should be enforced.*
It must then follow that when the promise is made to
one who has no interest in the property, there is no
unjust enrichment, for the promisee has suffered no loss
,by the sale of the property at less than its value; consequently, in the case of Shaffner v. Shaffner, 145 Pa. x63
(i89i), where there was a sheriff's sale of the interest of

one of two co-tenants of certain real estate, of which the
plaintiff was in possession, and B pfomised the plaintiff,
who was the owner of the other interest, before the sale,
tbat if he, B, bought that interest he would hold for the
benefit of plaintiff's daughter, and plaintiff filed a bill
against B to enforce the trust, a demurrer to the bill was
sustained. The court seemed to base the decision on
the ground that there was no fraud at the sale.
In the case of Martinv. Baird, 175 Pa. 540 (1896), the

principle that the fraud depends on A's loss and B's
gain is illustrated very plainly. In that case the defendant, who was about to purchase a hotel property in which
the plaintiff had a one-fourth interest, agreed with the
plaintiff before the sale, in writing, that he would transfer
* Accord. Cook v. Cook, 69 Pa. 443 (x87x); Blaylock's ALpeal, 73
Pa. 146 (1873); Heath's Appeal, ioo Pa. x (x882 ); CowpeN isats v.
136 Pa. 17S (1890).
1rockehoi,
The Bank, 102 Pa. 397 (1883); Gaines v.
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to the plaintiff a one-fourth interest in a property and
admit him to a partnership to be formed. It appeared
that the price received for the property by the plaintiff
and his co-owners was the full market price. Held,
the plaintiff could not, on defendant's r~fusal after the
purchase to carry out the agreement, enforce a trust
against him. The trust here was in writing; was an
imperfect declaration of trust. The plaintiff, however,
had received full value for his property; the defendant
was not unjustly enriched, but had paid what the property
was worth.
There may, however, be a valid binding contract
between A and B, as in the case of Beegle v. Wentz,
55 Pa. 369 (1867), where A agreed to withdraw his claim
for exemption if B would buy in and convey fifteen
acres to A. Held, that the agreement constituted B d
trustee for A as to the fifteen acres. The court regarded
this as a resulting trust, on the ground that as A had
relinquished a valuable right, he was in the same position
as if he had advanced part of the purchase money.
This, it is believed, is error, and the true ground of decision
was that B was a trustee within the principle hereinbefore
stated. In this case, however, A could have brought suit
on the contract, instead of proceeding to enforce the
trust. Query: Whether he had any remedy in -equity
at all here, the remedy at law being adequate.
If the promise was not made before the sale, A could
have no opportunity of relying on it, consequently, as in
the case of Fox v. Heffner, I W. & S. 372 (1841), where
the promise was made by B to A after the sale, it was held
that A was not in the position to complain. It is true
that that case was decided when the Supreme Court was
holding the erroneous doctrine that parol trusts were
within the Act of 1772. On the facts, however, the case
was rightly decided, and is, under the reasoning of the
court, so far as the present law is concerned, just as good
an authority as if decided since the Act of 1856. So also
in the case of Haines v. O'Conner, io Watts, 313 (1840),
where B acquired the property at the sale at an under-
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valuation, but made the promise at or after the time of
the purchase. The court instructing the jury said:
"You are therefore instructed that if B purchased this property
with his own money, expressing an intention to let the plaintiff have
it by reimbursing him his own money after he bought it fairly at
sheriff's sale as the highest and best bidder, and afterwards frequently
declared his willingness to give it him on the conditions which were
not accepted by the plaintiff or his friends, then the case is not a trust
ex-maleficio, but is within the Statute of Frauds."3

It is clear that A must have acted in some manner on
B's promise, for if it never was communicated to him he
could not afterwards take advantage of it, and if, being
communicated, he had not acted on it, he could not say
that he had changed his position in consequence, and as
in either of these cases he would have done whatever he
was going to do to protect his interest had the promise
not been made, the loss, if it occurred, would be because
of his own conduct, and the law could afford him no relief.
It is plain then on principle that A must have relied on
the promise. What must A have done in reliance on the
promise? The case of Kellum v. Smith, 33 Pa. 158 (1859),
decided that mere acquiescence is not a sufficient reliance.
In that case the court below permitted A to testify to the
arrangement between himself and B before the sale,
and that in consequence of B's promise he made no effort
to protect his interest or obtain the property at the sale.
The case was sent back for a new trial because of this
error. Strong J., in delivering the opinion of the court,
said:
"It may be that if, at the instance of the promisor, the promisee
is induced to incur some expense, which he otherwise would not have
done, the former shall be estopped from denying the trust. But
however this may be, mere acquiescence or omission to take other
3MeMerlo v. Freeman,211 Pa. 202 (19o5);"s. c., Freemanv. Laffersy,
Pa. 32 (1903). In this case, the syllabus is misleading, as it gives
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the impression that the case went on the ground of the Statute of
Limitations. The remarks of the learned judge on that point were
mere dicta. The promise was made after the sale. Therefore A suffered no loss because of the promise, and B acquired no unjust enrichment because of his failure to carry out the promise. Consequently,
the declaration being oral, the Statute of Frauds was always available
as a defence. The discussion as to the question of limitation, therefore,
was not in point. The limitation clause does not apply until a case
arises which could have been enforced within the five years.
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steps to obtain the proerty, though induced by faith in the promise,
is not available for such purpose.'

Now, in the case of Wolford v. Herrington, 86 Pa.
39 (1877), and Cowperthwaite v. The Bank, 102 Pa.
397 (1882), it was in evidence that A refrained from
bidding in reliance on B's promise, and although the
point was not discussed in either of these cases, it is
suggested that they represent the law, and that Mr.
Justice Strong misapprehended the situation. The
question, what is reliance on the promise in cases of this
kind, is always to be considered with reference to the
circumstances surrounding the parties, and as the only
way A can protect himself is by going to the sale and
bidding the property up, or have some one do it for him,
it is difficult to see how he can show any greater reliance
on B's promise than by acquiescing in the arrangement
and refraining from bidding.
Where, however, B proclaims at the sale that he is
bidding for A, having made no previous arrangement
with him, and by so doing deters others from bidding,
and acquires the property at undervaluation, the case
depends on different principles.
"If, by the artifice of the purchaser declaring that he was to buy for
the owner, others were prevented from bidding, and the land was
sold at a great undervaluation, this would make him a trustee."
Duncan J., in Pebbles v. Reading, 8 S. & R. 484 (1822); Accord.
Dictum in Christy v. Sill, 95 Pa. 380 (8So).

In the case of Brown v. Dysinger, i Rawle, 408 (1829),
B declared at the sale that he was buying for A, who was
a lessee merely, not a defendant in the execution. It
appeared that others stopped bidding in consequence of
the declaration. There was evidence of a previous understanding between A and B. The court held that B was a
trustee because of his declarations, using the following
significant language:
"Such conduct (declarations) would, in the language of the Chief
Justice, stop his mouth forever after from asserting anything contrary
to what he declared at and after the sale."4
4 In the case of Brown v. Dysinger, the court seemed to consider the
case under the mistaken notion that it came within th3 Statutz of
Frauds of 1772, so that the case was rightly decided at that ti a:
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Is not this an estoppel? B proclaims that he is buying
for A, when he is not, and made no such previous declaration to A. Now if B acquires the land at less than its
value, A is damaged, and can enforce a trust against B,
which he is now estopped to deny. B, however, is not
damaged unless he has an interest in the property. If
he is in that position, any sale at less than value diminishes the fund coming to him from the sheriff; and when
the parties stand in that relation, the case is plain.
Where, however, A is, as in the case of Brown v. Dysinger,
a mere lessee, with no interest whatever in the fund, it
is hard to see how he is damaged by the property being
sold at less than its value, and if he is not damaged, how
can he enforce the estoppel against B?
The principle involved in this line of cases is neatly
illustrated by the case of Feely v. Hoover, 130 Pa- 107
(1889). There, the attorney for B, the judgment creditor,
at the sale procured the property at an undervaluation,
and induced a competing bidder to withdraw. He had,
however, no previous arrangement with A, and made no
statement at the sale that he was going to hold for A,
and acted, and said he was acting, solely in the interests
of his client. It was held that there was no trust.
Mr. Justice Strong, in the case of Kellum v. Smith,
33 Pa., 158(1859), said:
"But the fraud which will convert the purchaser at a sheriff's sale
into a trust ex-maleficio of the debtor must have been.fraud at the
time of the sale. Subsequent covin will not answer any more than
subsequent payment of the purchase money will convert an absolute
purchase into a naked trust. When the purchaser at a sheriff's sale
promises to hold for the debtor, and afterwards refuses to comply
with his engagement, the fraud, if any, is not at the sale, but in the
promise and its subsequent breach"

In this, it is believed, the learned judge overlooked the
distinction between fraud on the part of a purchaser at
sheriff's sale, as to which any party interested could
complain, and fraud as between A and B. The sale may
The dissent of Todd J. was chiefly on the ground that the proof offered
was not sufficiently clear and precise to take the case to the jury.
See McCaskey v. Graff, 23 Pa. 321 (I854); Dick v. Cooper, 24 Pa.
217 (1854); Sey!ar v. Carson, 69 Pa. 8z (r871).
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be perfectly fair, and yet B will not be permitted to avail
himself of the Statute of Frauds.S
The fraud as between A and B consists in this, that B
had made a promise to A on the faith of which A has
permitted B to enrich himself at A's expense, expecting
B to fulfill the promise on the strength of the enrichment.
B has acquired an increment to his estate which he then
seeks to retain by pleading the statute. A plainer case
of running away with a benefit not intended can hardly
be imagined.
Where, however, the purchaser declares at. the time of
the sale, or subsequently, that he is buying for some one
else, there is no trust where that other person has no
interest in the property at the time, whether there is a
previous arrangement between them or not, for it is a
necessary element in this class of trusts that the party
seeking to enforce the trust must show that the defendant
has acquired a particular res, in which the plaintiff has.
an interest prior to the promise, and that that res.was
acquired at less than its value subsequent to the promise,
expressly or by inference because of the plaintiff's reliance
on the faith of the promise. Thus, in the case of Ksler v.
Kisler, 2 Watts, 323 (1834), where a guardian purchased
some land at a public sale, which he declared at the time
of the sale he was buying for the use of his ward, and the
ward had no interest in the property sold. Held, to be
an ordinary parol agreement to reconvey or be reimbursed the price, which is clearly within the Statute of
Frauds. Accord. Dictum of Gibson C. J. in Sidle v.
Walters, 5 Watts, 389 (1836).
There is another class of cases to be distinguished, and
that is those where A merely constitutes B his agent to
go and buy for him. B has made no promise or declaration, and cannot be considered a trustee6 from any point
of view, excepting only when A has given B the money
s For an instance of fraud at the sale, see Gilbert v. Hoffman, * Watts
66 (1833); Abbey v. Dewey, 2S Pa. 413 (1855).
6 Barne v. DougHy, 32 Pa. 371 (1859); See Irtwn v. Trego, 22 Pa.
368 (1853), decided before the passage of the Act of 1836.
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to buy with, in which circumstance the case depends on a
different principle. The case closest to the line is Sheriff
v. Neal, 6 Watts, 534 (1837), where B was constituted
a trustee and the trust enforced.
It is believed, therefore, that the law in Pennsylvania
is represented by the following proposition: If property
in which A has an interest is about to be sold at sheriff's
sale, and B by promising A before the sale to buy the
property and hold for A's benefit induces A not to protect
his interest, whereby B obtains the property for less than
its value, B will be held to his promise, and if the subjectmatter is real estate, the Statute of Frauds will not be
available as a defence to B.
Roland R. Foulke.
NoTE.-When B's title is subsequently sold by the sheriff, notice
of the trust must be given at the sale, otherwise the purchaser takes
discharged. Fillman v. Divers, 31 Pa. 429, x858; Myers v. Leas, iox

Pa.

172, 1882;

Lance v. Gorman, x36 Pa.

200, 1890.

If no notice is given at the sale, the purchaser takes clear of the
trust, and A can enforce his claim against the proceeds. Rupp's
Appeal, zoo Pa. 531, z88a.
Notice of a trust which does not exist does not affect purchaser.

Kegerreis v. Lutz, 187 Pa.

252,

1898.

In Burr v. Kase, x68 Pa. 81, x895, the agreement was in writing but
had been lost, and the court held that the evidence of the contents of
the lost paper was not sufficient.
If A takes a lease from B after the sale, the question whether his
acceptance of the lease amounts to a waiver and abandonment of the
claim is a question for the jury. Brown v. Dysinger, x Rawle, 408
(1829); Seylar v. Carson, 69 Pa. 81, 1871.
The question may come before the court in several ways: Ejectment
by A against B on the agreement. Jackman v. Ringland, 4 W. & S.
149, 1842. Ejectment by B against A, A setting up the agreement in defence. Sheriff v. Neal, 6 Watts, 534, 1837.
Bill on equity by A against B, to enforce the trust (Kisler's Appeal,
73 Pa. 393), 187u, in which case, if a responsive answer is filed. A is
within the usual chancery rule as to overcoming the effect thereof.
Beckett v. Allison, z88 Pa. 279, x898.
By proceedings, B against A, under the Act of 1836, P. L. 780.
Cowperthwaite v. Bank, 102 Pa. 397, 1883.
Trusts of this kind are within the five years limitation clause of the
Act of April 22, 1856, Sec. 6, P. L. 532; Christy v. Sill, 95 Pa. 380,
z88o.
But the statute does not run while the cestui que trust is in possession. Beegle v. Wentz, SS Pa. 369, z867.
Not necessary for A to make a tender. B is not entitled to reimbursement. Gilbert v. Hoffman, 2 Watts, 66, 1833; McCaskey v. Graff,
23 Pa. 32x; Seylar v. Carson, 69 Pa. 8t, x87i.

